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THE PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE
GUIDELINES GOVERNING RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS:
An Analysis of the Policy-Making Process
Introduction
The Public Health Service (PHS), largely through its National
Institutes of Health (NIH), is the federal government's chief agency for
supporting and conducting medical research. For the 1970 fiscal year
NIH appropriations totaled $1.5 billion and NIH support for medical
2
research was approximately 53% of total federal support for such research.
Thus, the tempo, character and direction of the nation's medical research
effort is preeminently influenced by NIH programs and policies. Involved
in this major research effort is a significant amount of clinical research
using human subjects. In 1970 there were more than 11,000 research
grants awarded by NIH and "slightly over 30%" of these involved human
o
subjects. The NIH, of course, is responsible primarily for the support
of a national program of research in the health sciences. In implementing
this responsibility, the NIH maintains its own intramural research
program, issues contracts for particular research studies, and distributes
research grants to non-profit research institutions and their investigators.
United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Public
Health Service, National Institutes of Health. NIH Almanac 1971
(Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1971), p. 99.
2Ibid., p. 109.
Interview with Donald T. Chalkley, Chief, Institutional Relations
Section, Division of Research Grants, NIH, Bethesda, Maryland, June 22, 1971.
While other PHS components maintain similar, though smaller programs,
policy related to the administration of the extramural research program
is largely determined by NIH. This study is concerned with one of these
policies, the PHS Guidelines regarding the protection of the individual
as a research subject. Part I of the study examines the evolution of
the first issuance of the PHS Guidelines and subsequent revisions through
4
the promulgation of the Protection Of The Individual As A Research Subject
on May 1, 1969. Part II of the study analyzes the process by which these
Guidelines were developed and examines the values, motivations and other
underlying factors which led to their formulation. This analysis is con-
structed in the context of various theoretical and conceptual frameworks
of decision-making and attempts to explain why the policy evolved as it
did. It is not the purpose of this study to evaluate the Guidelines in
principle or to assess their effectiveness. While the author recognizes
the worth of a study "testing" the validity of many of the key decisions
as well as of evaluating the efficacy of the Guidelines, such an effort
would probably require another study equal to or greater in scope than this
one.
The importance of the PHS Guidelines is found most of all in their
relationship to society, its health and its values. The Guidelines
represent the government's attempt to protect the interest and investment
4
United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Public
Health Service, Division of Research Grants. Protection Of The Individual
As A Research Subject (Washington, D.C.: GPG, 1969), Publication No. 0-348-095.
-*Dr. Bernard Barber and his Research Group on Human Experimentation at
Barnard College, Columbia University, have made such a study. Their findings
were presented in a series of four papers at the American Association for the
Advancement of Science (A.A.A.S.) Annual Meeting in Chicago, Illinois,
December 1970.
of the American people. Such interest and investment are evidenced by the
nation's annual commitment of more than one billion dollars to the NIH, which
is "a decision by the American people,expressed through the Congress, to
invest a substantial share of the nation's resources in research leading to
the improvement of health." But while the American people accept health as
an important value, they also recognize the value of individual worth and
dignity. The Guidelines reflect the fact that society assigns great importance
to protecting the individual against possible injury while simultaneously
desiring to maximize the freedom of scientific inquiry. "This policy seeks
to avoid the danger of direct federal intervention, case by case, on the one
hand, and the dangers inherent in decision by an individual scientist on the
other." The knowledge explosion has brought to the policy-making process
a confrontation of scientific knowledge, ethical values and political
responsibility. The Guidelines represent an attempt on the part of an
administrative agency to reconcile those factors as they relate to a
specific area of the quest for new knowledge and to develop a climate in
which clinical research can prosper.
Examination of the Guidelines also focuses attention on public
policy-making by a federal agency. By identifying the important substantive
issues as well as the key decision-makers and the critical values which
supported their policy decisions, one can more easily account for the
William H. Stewart, Former Surgeon General, United States Public
Health Service, in Committee on Government Operations, National Commission
on Health Science and Society. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Government
Research, United States Senate, on S.J. Res. 145, 90th Congress, 2nd session,
1968, p. 210.
7Ibid., p. 211.
resultant policy. At a time when new scientific and technological
developments have rekindled the debate regarding the merits and feasibility
of various approaches to making public policy, an analysis of this policy-
making process may help one to evaluate this debate. At the very least, it
should provide valuable insight into one instance of public policy as it
was actually developed.
PART I: THE EVOLUTION OF THE P.H.S. GUIDELINES
In the Foreword to the Protection of the Individual as a
Research Subject, former Surgeon General William H. Stewart wrote that
"I believe that we have taken important steps toward protecting the
human being who is a subject of research, while encouraging the conduct
Q
of excellent research on man." The steps of which Surgeon General
Stewart wrote evolved over a long period of time. While the first offi-
cial statement of government policy concerning its extramural research
program was issued only in 1966, the issues underlying the development of
the policy extend some years further back in time. In order to understand
more fully the basis upon which recent policy decisions were made, it will
be useful first to examine the thinking and practices relevant to medical
research prior to the initiation of formal government involvement.
Historical Antecedents
Experimentation on man for scientific purposes dates back to
the beginning of recorded history. Justification for such experimentation
lies in the belief that, before any new technique may be considered
acceptable medical practice or procedure for use in man, it must first
be tested on a human being. "While prior experimentation in animals is
Q
William H. Stewart, Protection of the Invididual as a Research Subject,
p. iv.
absolutely necessary when possible, the crucial study of new techniques
and agents must be carried out in man. The current development of
human biochemistry, human physiology, human pharmocology has made it
9
plain that man is the 'animal of necessity.1" Paralleling this
need for experimentation on man is the constant need to evaluate the
procedures involved.
Prior to 1950 there were no specific federal or state statutes
designed to regulate research institutions or investigators in their
10
use of human beings for experimental purposes. In fact, there
existed some uncertainty among those involved in medical research
about what the law did say about medical research. In general, most
hypothesizing about what such legal doctrines might state with respect
to human experimentation derived from a long line of British and American
court decisions involving common-law actions of medical malpractice. As
far back as 1767, in Slater v. Baker and Stapleton, an English court
concluded that "many men very skillful in their profession have
frequently acted out of the common way for the sake of trying experiments
they have acted ignorantly and unskillfully, contrary to the known rule
9
Henry K. Beecher, Experimentation in Man (Illinois: Charles C.
Thomas, 1959), p. 9.
10
William J. Curran, "Governmental Regulation of the Use of Human
Subjects in Medical Research: The Approach of Two Federal Agencies,"
Daedalus, vol. 98, No. 2, of the Proceedings of the American Academy of
Arts and Sciences, Spring 1969, p. 54.
n2 Wils. [K.B.] 359, 95 Eng. Rep. 860 (1767).
and useage of surgeons." The Court then disciplined the chief surgeon
for failure to obtain the consent of the patient permitting the use
of a new procedure. In the leading American case, Carpenter v. Blake
(1871), the Court cited the Slater opinion and concluded that "when
the case is one as to which a treatment has been followed for a long
time, there should be no departure from it ... The rule protects
the community against reckless experiments." The general conclusion
drawn from these examples as well as subsequent decisions was that the
scope of a physician's practice did not include the right to experiment
with human beings. However, in a 1935 case, Fortner v. Koch, the
Court did recognize the importance of clinical investigation for
medical progress. "We recognize the fact that if the general practice
of medicine and surgery is to progress, there must be a certain amount
of experimentation carried on." The Court stated further that such
experimentation must be done with the patient's knowledge and consent
and "must not vary too much from the accepted methods of practice."
This case, similar to the ones before it, appears to indicate that the
judiciary associated experimentation with irresponsible behavior and
professional negligence. "Experimentation was seemingly equated with
ignorant and unskillful departure from approved methods." Yet none
of these cases actually prohibited experimental procedures which took
place in a controlled environment and which were directed toward the
1260 Barb. 488 N.Y. (1871).
13272 Mich. 273; 261 N.W. 762 (1935).
^Elwyn L. Cady, Jr., "Medical Malpractice: What About Experimentation?,"
Annals of Western Medicine and Surgery, vol. 6, March 1952, p. 164.
discovery of new knowledge not necessarily of direct benefit to the
patient or subject. Past court decisions simply "failed to recognize
the important distinction between poor medical practice and legitimate
research.'' Yet, by the very nature of medical practice, physicians
have always been involved in experimentation. "Every treatment is,
in a sense, an experiment. There is no certainty that there will be
complete safety for every patient, nor is there certainty that every
diagnostic procedure will be safe. Each patient presents a unique and
different research problem." Even no treatment at all can be a form
of experimentation. In these instances the traditional safeguard was the
fidelity of the physician to his patient. However, medical research
directed primarily at the acquisition of new knowledge, like all other
activities in our society, is subject to the application of the law.
While the law regarding the liability of the investigator involved in
clinical research remained undeveloped, it appeared that some experimentation
was permissible and that,
since the courts rely on what the profession develops as
acceptable practice, the principles and methods established
by reputable public and private organizations will be
employed as guidelines in determining whether the research
has been properly performed and whether the patients or
subjects have been safeguarded.-'-'
Irving Ladimer, "Human Experimentation: Medico-legal Aspects,"
New England Journal of Medicine, vol. 257, July 4, 1957, p. 23.
l^Chauncey Leake, "Top Scientists Probe Dilemmas of Research Ethics,"
Medical World News. May 5, 1967, p. 37.
Report of the National Conference on the Legal Environment of
Medical Science. Published jointly by the National Society for Medical Researct
and the University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois, May 27-28, 1959, pp. 82-83.
Thus, it was apparently in the best interest of the medical community to
develop acceptable standards of care in their research.
Initial PHS Involvement
The PHS first became involved with the development of such
standards with the opening of the NIH Clinical Center in 1953. The
Center brought together talented young scientists and outstanding
research leaders from throughout the world in order to seek new
knowledge for the benefit of mankind. Edward J. Rourke, formerly of the
Office of General Counsel, Department of Health, Education and Welfare
(DREW), emphasizes this primary goal. "If the Clinical Center meant
anything at all, it was doing nonstandard things for more than
18
therapeutic purposes ... It sought to acquire new information."
Individuals admitted to the Clinical Center were categorized into two
classes: (1) Normal Volunteers—healthy persons who had volunteered to
serve as normal controls for clinical investigation. Most of the
volunteers were members of religious sects who served in this capacity
as an obligation of service to their particular faith; and (2) Patients—
individuals who had a disease that required further investigation,
diagnosis, or treatment.
With the establishment of the Clinical Center, the ethical
and moral problems connected with research on human subjects came sharply
•^ Interview with Edward J. Rourke, former Assistant General Counsel,
Public Health Grants and Services Division, Office of General Counsel,
DHEW, Arlington, Virginia, June 18, 1971.
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into focus. The issues first arose "with respect to what limits should
19be applied in the case of normal subjects or volunteers." At that
time it was felt that the use of experimental procedures for patients
was part of the doctor-patient relationship; "a positive decision was
made that it would be intrusive for an administrative body to interfere
20
with that relationship." That relationship, of course, did not apply
to the normal volunteer and this was an important area of concern among
NIH officials. "A fairly extensive effort was made to devise a set of
guidelines and procedures governing the use of normal controls in
O -I
clinical investigations within NIH and the clinical research programs."
There were two important issues which came to the attention of NIH
officials. "First, there was the degree of hazard or risk which we
felt it was appropriate to subject anyone to. The second major question
was the kind of information . . . which we felt should be made available
,22
to these people." To answer those questions, the NIH, on November 17,
1953, issued a set of principles and procedures for the protection of
the individual. The guidelines, referred to as "Group Consideration of
Clinical Research Procedures Deviating From Accepted Medical Practice or
19Interview with Joseph S. Murtaugh, former Director of the Office
of Program Planning, National Institutes of Health, Washington, D.C.,
March 26, 1971.
20Interview with James A. Shannon, former Director of the National
Institutes of Health, New York City, May 13, 1971.
21
Interview with Joseph S. Murtaugh.
22Interview with Irving Ladimer, former Assistant Director of Research
Planning, National Institutes of Health, New York City, May 14, 1971.
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Involving Unusual Hazard,"* placed primary responsibility for the
formulation and conduct of clinical research and medical care on the
principal investigators. However, "in order to assist the principal
investigator in making determinations with respect to research projects
and medical procedures which may involve deviation from accepted
medical practice or potential hazard to the life or well-being of the
patient or subject, methods for obtaining group consideration and
23
advice are established."
Such group consideration was instituted in the following
manner. Each Institute Director and the Director of the Clinical Center
was to establish a committee to review and make recommendations to him
concerning clinical projects proposed by his staff that involved
unusual hazard to the patient. A Medical Board, composed of representatives
of each research institute and of the Clinical Center staff, established
a Clinical Research Committee for the purpose of reviewing and reporting
to the Medical Board on clinical research procedures involving unusual
hazard or deviating from accepted medical practice. Cases were referred
to the Committee by an Institute, by the Director of the Clinical Center,
or by the Director of the NIH. This Committee reviewed the medical,
scientific and ethical propriety of any questionable procedure. This
procedure differed depending upon whether the project involved patients
or normal volunteers. Projects involving patients were considered by the
*These guidelines were revised in July 1966.
M. Sessoms, "Guiding Principles in Medical Research
Involving Humans," Hospitals, Journal of the American Hospital Association,
vol. 32, January 1, 1958, p. 62.
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Clinical Research Committee only if referred to it for the reasons
cited above. On the other hand, all research projects involving normal
volunteers were referred to the Committee. Recommendations of the
Committee were submitted, through the Medical Board, to the Director
of the NIH, who had the final authority to decide such matters. With
respect to the question of how much information was to be given to the
research subject, the guidelines provided that "the patient or subject
of clinical study shall be considered a member of the research team and
shall be afforded an understanding suited to his comprehension of the
investigation contemplated, including particularly any potential
danger to him." Where there was the possibility of an unusual hazard,
the written consent of the subject was required and a statement was
entered on the patient's chart or on a separate memorandum, indicating
his understanding of the procedure and its purpose, including the
potential hazards to him, and his consent to participate. Through these
1953 Guidelines, the general problems that one might experience in
clinical research were discussed and means for avoiding those problems
were established.
The Extramural Research Program
In its early years, the extramural research program was not
subject to the same guidelines adopted for the intramural program.
To cope effectively with the processing of these research grants,
applications were subjected to a review process initiated at the request
of the National Advisory Health Council in 1946. A grant application
was first reviewed by the Division of Research Grants (DRG) to assure
13
basic compliance with NIH requirements. The grants were then assigned
to various Study Sections made up of scientists with acknowledged
competence in the scientific disciplines involved in the proposed
research project. These panels passed judgment on the relative scientific
merit of the proposal. Following the Study Section review, the
proposals were forwarded to the Advisory Councils of each of the
respective Institutes. These groups, composed of highly qualified
individuals representing diverse backgrounds, provided the NIH with a
mechanism of peer judgment augmented by wider considerations of social
needs essential to a balanced and effective research program. Their
concern was with the relevance and importance of the proposed project
to the mission of the Institute. Since there was never any requirement
that a Study Section or Advisory Council employ any particular set of
ethical principles or guidelines, these official bodies
relied primarily on the collective experience and
judgments of their members. Almost without exception,
they were members of a profession which had established
a code or set of principles, or they had subscribed
to a particular code such as those developed by the
American Medical Association or the World Health
Organization.
Once a research proposal received approval, its conduct became the
responsibility of the investigator and his institution for a period of
up to seven years. The investigator was free to pursue his objectives,
limited only by his own knowledge and ethical considerations and by any
guidelines provided by his institution. In the late 1950's the NIH
^Interview with Donald T. Chalkley.
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explored the possibility of adopting the Nuremberg Code, or one
similar to it. This Code had developed from the trials of Nazi doctors
who were tried for criminal action because of the experiments they had
performed upon captives held in concentration camps and hospitals.
The Code permitted some experimentation using human subjects, but
explicitly enumerated the guidelines which should be followed when
conducting such experimentation. "The effort foundered largely because
of the difficulty of devising a single code that would cover with equal
adequacy and equal flexibility the entire range of biomedical
o f
experimentation." The pervasive posture of the NIH during these
years was to permit researchers "to be guided by their own professional
judgment and controlled by their own ethical standards as well as those
27
of their institution.
While the NIH did not issue formal regulations or guidelines
governing medical research, this is not to suggest that officials were
unconcerned with ethical problems or with protecting human subjects from
potential research hazards. There was a continuous flow of advice from
the NIH to individual investigators and institutions. In addition the
National Advisory Councils had discussed some of these problems. "The
questions constantly arose, Is the institution aware of what this
25
United States v. Karl Brandt, et. al., United States Adjutant
General's Department, TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE NUREMBERG MILITARY
TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10 (October 1946-April 1949),
The Medical Case, vol. 2 (1947).
26Interview with Donald T. Chalkley.
27
Curran, op. cit., supra, n. 10 at 549.
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individual investigator is intending to do? Have they really read this
application over carefully? ° Former Surgeon General Stewart writes
that "the National Advisory Heart Council had had discussions on human
experimentation before I became Surgeon General (in 1965) and there
had been developed at least a certification on grant applications that
29human subjects were protected." Such concern developed primarily
because of the rapid growth of medical research in the United States.
By the latter part of the 1950's public expenditures for medical research
had increased considerably as the NIH,by expanding its extramural
research program,increased the capability for more clinical investigation
throughout the country. Accompanying this expansion in medical research
was a rapid increase in research involving human subjects. The nature
of experimental procedures was also changing. The development of new
surgical techniques made possible more complex and invasive surgical
actions, culminating in the processes of organ transplantation. Initial
efforts in the field of kidney transplantation had a special impact.
Dr. James A. Shannon, Director of the NIH from 1955-1968, recalls an
incident that occurred at a University hospital where a surgeon
transplanted, without success, an animal kidney into a human being.
What distressed Shannon most was that the surgeon "did it on his own
without prior consultation with anybody" connected with the medical
school or the University "and that the procedure as performed on the
78
Interview with Donald T. Chalkley.
29william H. Stewart, in a letter to this author, February 16,
1971.
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basis of then current information had neither likelihood of therapeutic
benefit to the patient nor likelihood of providing new scientific
30information." Thus there developed at the NIH a
clear consciousness that there wasn't an adequate
scientific base for that action, that it was entirely
experimental in character and that there was the
growing need to make certain that all the implications
of that act . . . had been clearly examined and that
there was a valid basis for proceeding with that kind
of experimentation in terms of the scientific objectives
to be achieved and the protection and condition of the
experimental subject involved. ^
Similar problems also arose in the intramural program.
It became apparent from reading the protocols from the
various Institutes that too frequently the statement
was made that this is a safe procedure because it has
been utilized on a patient with a particular type of
disease. So it seemed that certain nontherapeutic
procedures were being utilized in patients with disease
quite properly to obtain specific types of information
relative to the nature of the disease or its effect on
certain systems. But at the same time these were
nonstandard procedures and did not receive the careful
review that the same procedures would have received in
a normal individual. 2
The Clinical Center guidelines written in 1953 were, of course, very
flexible with respect to treatment involving a doctor and his patient,
which was dealt with in terms of the long-standing doctor-patient
relationship. However, after reviewing some of the Institute protocols,
Shannon began to inquire, on an Institute-by-Institute basis, about the
types of programs of an experimental nature that were being conducted on
diseased patients. "We found that much nonstandard diagnostic and
Interview with James A. Shannon.
-^Interview with Joseph S. Murtaugh.
32Interview with James A. Shannon.
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therapeutic devices were being used." •* It soon became evident to NIH
officials that
the absence of.any written guidelines on the . . .
employment of investigative drugs or procedures
with respect to the sick patient was no longer a
tolerable situation and that something in the way
of a set of basic guidelines to govern this area
of activity had to be developed. The pressure
internally was growing by virtue of the same
advances in medical and surgical capability that
was being reflected as well in the Clinical Center
as it was throughout the teaching hospitals of
the nation.34
Another issue integrally linked to the expansion of the extramural
program was "what kind of responsibility did the granting agency, the
NIH, bear in respect to the circumstances and conditions in which
investigative activity was carried out?"^^
In addition to this internal perception of the problem by key
NIH officials, the medical community was reminded of the issues
pertaining to human experimentation by a 1959 book called Experimentation
in Man. Author Henry K. Beecher wrote,
Ethical and moral implications and problems surround every
facet of experimentation in man. The central conclusion
is that it is unethical and immoral to carry out potentially
dangerous experiments without the subject's knowledge and
permission. It also requires . . . profound thought and
consideration on the part of the physician, for the complexities
of medicine are in some cases so great, it is not reasonable
to expect that the patient can be adequately informed as to
the full implications of what his consent means.^6
Interview with Joseph S. Murtaugh.
35Idem.
3"Beecher, n. 9, supra, at p. 43.
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Recognition of this myriad of problems prompted the NIH in
January 1960 to award a three-year grant to the Boston University Law-
Medicine Research Institute to conduct a study of actual practices in
clinical research in the United States with regard to the legal, moral
and ethical issues involved. Of the study's-' findings, of special
significance were the results of a 1962 survey which was sent to 86
departments of medicine and which produced 52 responses. The replies
did not indicate any trend toward establishing guidelines or procedures
concerning clinical research. Only nine institutions replied that
they had a procedural document; an additional five indicated either
that they were in the process of developing such a document or that
they favored one for their institution. However, upon close examination
of those documents, only two of the nine were guidelines generally
applicable to all clinical research. The departments were also asked
if they used special consent forms for research; only 16 answered
positively.
As a result of their recognition of the problems related to
human experimentation, it is not surprising that NIH officials began
at this time to search for a mechanism to assure that experiments for
which public money was being used would receive public screening.
According to former Surgeon General Luther L. Terry, "the granting
authorities in the Public Health Service were concerned about the
O Q
Government's responsibility in the absence of such a policy." The
Irving Ladimer and Donald B. Kennedy, Clinical Investigation in
Medicine; Legal, Ethical and Moral Aspects (Boston University Law-Medicine
Research Institute, 1963.
00
Luther L. Terry, in a letter to this author, February 23, 1971.
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obvious problem was to develop a reasonable basis for judging the
experimental activities of clinical investigators.
The Policy-Making Environment
During this period of time another federal agency was
involved with a similar problem. Congressional hearings concerning
the use and control of drugs were begun by Senator Estes Kefauver's
Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly in December 1958. As a result
OQ
of the hearings, Congress passed the Drug Amendments of 1962, which
were explicit in requiring the Secretary of the Department of Health
Education and Welfare, through the Food and Drug Administration (FDA),
to issue regulations governing the testing of new drugs. Included
in the amendments was a provision that made mandatory the consent of a
subject before he became part of a procedure involving an experimental
drug. The Congressional debate surrounding the introduction and use
of experimental drugs had its effect on NIH policy-makers. It made
clear to them "the inadequacy of the (PHS) Guidelines with respect to
the physician-patient relationship" and also brought into focus the
"question of what constituted consent."
In the latter part of 1963, persons from the Office of the
Surgeon General and officials from the NIH began more in-depth discussions
of the subject of human research. As a result of some preliminary
39P.L. 87-781, 21 U.S.C. 355.
^Interview with Joseph S. Murtaugh.
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discussions, Shannon asked the Division of Research Facilities and
Resources (DRFR),* which at that time supported the establishment of
general clinical research centers, to investigate clearance procedures
of current investigation in terms of the conventions that existed at
that time and in terms of what they would recommend as a suitable set
of controls. Selected to head this study was Dr. Robert B. Livingston,
then Associate Chief for Program Development, DRFR. In a memorandum
to Shannon, Livingston outlined the steps that he would follow in
proceeding with his investigation:
Stage one would aim to define the scope of
the study, outline the essential issues, identify
the ethically responsible relationships, and specify
procedures for carrying out the main study if such
is to be undertaken. Stage one would naturally
involve a careful assessment of the wisdom of a
Government agency undertaking an examination of
those problems.
The second stage would undertake an examination
of the range and tenor of present professional
practices and the nature of the educational,
informational, and intellectual guidance processes
involved in providing patterns of practice in this
delicate area. These considerations would be
essential to any recommendations which might be
transmitted to you and the Surgeon General.
In replying to Livingston's memorandum, Shannon generally agreed with
the scope and plan that Livingston had outlined and emphasized his
concern about the end results of such a study.
*Due to a NIH reorganization, this division is now the Division of
Research Resources (DRR).
Robert B. Livingston, Memorandum to Director, NIH, "Moral and
Ethical Aspects of Clinical Investigation," February 20, 1964.
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I think it is important to emphasize that
our end objective in this matter is to clarify
our responsibility as a supporting agency and to
identify the courses of action that our responsibility
imposes upon us. ^ 2
Livingston, with assistance from NIH's Office of Program
Planning, completed the study and submitted his report on November 4,
/ O
1964. Concerning the background of the problem, the report made
the following points:
Historically progressive changes in the kinds of
clinical research possible to undertake are changing
the nature of risks and values relating to clinical
research.
There is no generally accepted professional code
relating to the conduct of clinical research.
The legal status of clinical research is ambiguous.
The NIH supports clinical research in a wide
variety of research institutions and hospitals. There
exist conspicuous differences in institutional attitudes
toward acceptable professional conduct of clinical research.
As the number of investigators, subjects and
institutions engaged in clinical research increases and
as the nature of the risks ventured changes according to J;
the extension of research into new areas, a mounting
concern is expressed over the possible repercussions of
untoward events which are increasingly likely to occur
and which may occur in an unfavorable pattern of context.
Highly consequential risks are being taken by individuals
and institutions as well as the NIH as a direct result
of the complexity and ambiguity associated with research
on man. ^
The report also referred to the wide publicity then being given
42James A. Shannon, Memorandum to Dr. Robert B. Livingston, "Review
of the Ethical Aspects of Clinical Investigation," March 5, 1964
(Hereinafter referred to as "Memorandum to Livingston").
43Robert B. Livingston, Memorandum to Director, NIH, "Progress
Report on Survey of Moral and Ethical Aspects of Clinical Investigation,"
November 4, 1964 (Hereinafter referred to as "Livingston Report").
44Ibid., pp. 2-3.
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to earlier experiments at the Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital in
Brooklyn, New York, which had resulted in charges of unethical conduct
against Dr. Chester M. Southam and Dr. Emanuel E. Handel. This
research project had been funded by grants from the PHS and the American
Cancer Society. It is important to examine some of the details of the
incident because it probably "stimulated a greater attention to the
problems' associated with research in humans.
Dr. Southam was a physician acting as an employee of the
Sloan-Kettering Institute in New York and was conducting cancer research.
Dr. Mandel was the Director of Medicine and Director of Medical Education
at the Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital. Both doctors were found guilty,
censured, and placed on probation for their "conduct in the planning
and execution of a research project at the Jewish Chronic Disease
Hospital . . . prior to and on or about and after July 16, 1963."
The two doctors were found "guilty of fraud or deceit and unprofessional
conduct for injecting cancer cells into patients.1"*^ The doctors
informed the patients that they were going to do something to them of
an experimental nature, but they "did not tell the patients that they
were receiving cancer cell injections, and . . . [the patients] were not
asked for written consent."^ This episode focused attention upon the
Interview with Edward J. Rourke.
Regents Committee on Discipline, University of the State of New
York, Report on the Matter of Southam and Mandel, Nos. 158, 159 (undated).
Physicians Put on Year's Probation," New York Times, December
15, 1965, p. 58.
Elinor Langer, "Human Experimentation: Cancer Studies at Sloan-
Kettering Stir Public Debate on Medical Ethics," Science, vol. 143,
February 7, 1964, p. 552.
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actual and potential risk that humans could carelessly be used to
achieve the objectives of clinical investigators whose ultimate goals
may have been very commendable, but who were exercising unacceptable
judgment in achieving those goals. Since NIH officials had been
concerned with such problems prior to this incident, its impact upon
them is not surprising.
It made all of us aware of the inadequacy of our
guidelines and procedures and it clearly brought to
the fore the basic issue that in the setting in
which the patient is involved in an experimental
effort, the judgment of the investigator is not
sufficient as a basis for reaching a conclusion
concerning the ethical and moral set of questions
in that relationship.49
The case also brought into focus the legal issues in which the PHS could
become involved and dramatized the PHS responsibilities as a public
agency. One participant at the National Advisory Health Council (NAHC)
meeting on September 28, 1965, clearly expressed this concern when he
stated that "if the Southam-Mandel case were to come to court, I think we
[the PHS] would look pretty bad by not having any system or any procedure
whereby we could be even aware of whether there was a problem of this
kind being created by the use of our funds."50 A related case, Fink
v. Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital, did eventually reach a state court in
New York. The defendant hospital demanded that the PHS, as one of the
sponsors of the research, hold the hospital innocent and take over the
defense of the action. The PHS rejected this demand and denied legal
Interview with Joseph S. Murtaugh.
^Stenographic Transcript, National Advisory Health Council meeting
in Washington, D.C., September 28, 1965 (Hereinafter referred to as
"Transcript, NAHC meeting").
responsibility. The case was settled out of court; the plaintiff
reportedly received a large sum of money. While no precedent was
established in the area of a grantor's legal responsibility, government
officials were clearly aware of the possible implications. One legal
advisor, Edward J. Rourke, suggested at the time that "the greater
need for the PHS is to define to what extent it has responsibility"
with respect to its status as a granting agency.
In his report, Livingston also directed his attention to the
problem of NIH control.
NIH is not in a position to shape the educational
foundations of medical ethics . . . More than that,
whatever the NIH might do by way of designing a code
or stipulating standards for acceptable clinical
research would be likely to inhibit, delay, or distort
the carrying out of clinical research ... it would
be advantageous to the national health research
program if any general guidelines or code of clinical
research behavior were developed by a nonfederal body . . .
In our view, it would add to existing insecurities
if the NIH were to assume an exclusive or authoritarian
position concerning the definition of ethical boundaries
or conditions mandatory for clinical research.52
One of the participants in the Livingston group recalls the reluctance
on the part of the group to suggest any action by the NIH. "It was
very difficult to get that small group that was convened to agree on the
necessity for any action on the part of the NIH. There was strong
resistance on attempting to set forth any guidelines or restraints or
53policies in this area." It was this particular part of the report,
•"-Edward J. Rourke, Memorandum to the Surgeon General, "Clinical
Research," October 26, 1965, p. 3.
-^Livingston Report, pp. 7-8.
^Interview with Joseph S. Murtaugh.
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regarding the responsibility of the NIH, that Shannon found "wholly
unsatisfactory, because what it said basically was that what a
scientist does within his own institution is of no concern to the
PHS and therefore there is no reason for you as Director of the NIH
to be concerned with what was going on."5^ For Shannon this was an
unsatisfactory resolution of a significant problem; it was his
conviction that "we did have as an institutional responsibility the
decision to assure that an institution had a mechanism that would have
to be used to review the experimental work for suitability."55
In July 1964, as part of the process of developing its
report, the Livingston group held an informal, ad hoc meeting with a
small number of NIH advisors knowledgeable about problems relating to
clinical research and experienced in a variety of research institutions
and professional societies. This ad hoc committee made four
recommendations; they were included in Livingston's report. These
recommendations may be summarized as follows:
1. That an appropriate professional group be encouraged
to formulate a statement of principles relating to the
moral and ethical aspects of clinical investigation.
2. That there was a need for more factual information
regarding actual research practices.
3. That the NIH should consider providing advice, at
the request of grantees, concerning the ethical problems
and risk-reducing practices appropriate for the development
of clinical research.
5
*Interview with James A. Shannon.
55Idem.
5
^Livingston Report, pp. 9-11.
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4. That research grant documentation relating to
clinical investigation using human subjects should
be identified for special consideration throughout
the NIH-PHS review process.
In his letter of transmittal to the Surgeon General, Shannon
agreed in principle with all four recommendations, and urged "that
the highest priority be given [to] the rapid accomplishment of the
objectives" of the first and fourth recommendations. However, he
gave evidence of his belief that the first recommendation "did not
58
constitute a means for executive action," and suggested an alternative
course of action.
We are in full agreement with the advisory group that
there is a need for a widely acceptable statement of
principles relating to the moral and ethical aspects
of clinical investigation. The problem is to conceive
of a manner by which the statement of principles will
be assured of endorsement as a consensus position which
can serve as a positive guide to the conduct of clinical
research. The advisors recommend that this statement
of principles be developed by an appropriate professional
group. We are inclined to think a broader approach may
be necessary.
To win general acceptance within not only the medical
research community but also our society at large, the
final statement of principles should probably emerge
from a group which includes representatives of the whole
ethical, moral and legal interests of society. The
nature of this group and the manner of its convening
remains the critical question in acting upon recommendation
number one. This question needs further discussion.
During 1965 Shannon continued discussion of this particular point with
members of his own staff, with the hope of deriving a method by which to
James A. Shannon, letter of transmittal to the Surgeon General,
"Moral and Ethical Aspects of Clinical Investigation," January 7, 1965
(Hereinafter referred to as "letter of transmittal").
58Interview with James A. Shannon.
59Shannon, letter of transmittal.
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establish such a statement of principles. In the meantime, the issues
surrounding experimental research on man were receiving world-wide
attention. The World Medical Association issued its "Declaration of
Helsinki," which permitted experimentation, with the patient's consent,
if the experiment could be justified on therapeutic grounds. The
Medical Research Council of Great Britain declared that experimentation
was permissible as long as "the true consent of the subject is explicitly
obtained," at least in those cases where there is "no direct benefit to
the individual and that, in consequence, if he is to submit to it he
must volunteer in the full sense of the world." A decision was
subsequently made by Shannon and Surgeon General Terry to bring the
matter before the National Advisory Health Council (NAHC) at its September
1965 meeting. The Council, which had members representing both the
medical and scientific professions, was designed to take up issues within
the health field which had very broad policy implications.
The feeling was that we ought to have this kind of
public concurrence for the procedural actions that
we were going to take. That is why it was submitted
to the Council. The report of the ad hoc committee
was never considered a sufficient basis of action
without some kind of broader concurrence. The National
Advisory Health Council provided that mechanism.62
Prior to that September meeting, however, another important
policy development occurred within the NIH. In March 1965, the National
60World Medical Association, "Declaration of Helsinki," Helsinki,
Finland, 1964.
61Medical Research Council of Great Britain, "Responsibility in
Investigations on Human Subjects," British Medical Journal, vol. 2, July
18, 1964, pp. 178-79.
62Interview with Joseph S. Murtaugh.
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Advisory Heart Council adopted for the National Heart Institute a
special procedure relating to cases involving hazardous clinical
research proposals. The procedure stated that
it is the responsibility of the applicant or grantee
institution to furnish the Institute with a statement
of acceptance of its responsibility in the use of the
procedure or procedures in question. The Institute
has the responsibility for deciding whether to issue
a statement of grant award and whether to release
grant funds with or without first having obtained such
a statement.°3
Recognizing the problems faced by the NIH with respect to its
responsibilities in the area of moral and ethical aspects of clinical
investigation, Dr. John Sherman, then NIH Associate Director for
Extramural Programs, urged that "each Institute adopt in principle the
sense of the document as an interim measure until such time as it is
superseded by a definite PHS policy."6^* At the July 1, 1965, meeting of
the NIH Executive Committee for Extramural Affairs a motion to adopt
the basic principles of the Heart Institute procedure was passed.
In a letter dated September 13, 1965, Congressman Cornelius
E. Gallagher (N.J.), who was Chairman, Special Inquiry of the House
Committee on Government Operations, notified Surgeon General Terry that
he was conducting an investigation regarding the problem of the invasion
of privacy as it was related to certain investigative activities of the
Federal Government. Gallagher wrote that
National Heart Institute Extramural Procedure In Case Of Hazardous
Research Proposals," March 15, 1965.
John Sherman, Meeting of the NIH Executive Committee for
Extramural Affairs, July 1, 1965.
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One of our primary concerns has been the use of
personality tests, inventories and questionnaires in
research projects financed by grants and contracts
under the Federal Government. It is our belief
that the sponsoring agencies should adopt effective
policies and guidelines to make certain that the
protection of individual privacy is a matter of
paramount concern and that the testing is without
compulsion.°^
Terry referred this letter to Dr. Philip R. Lee, then Assistant Secretary
for Health and Scientific Affairs, Department of Health, Education
and Welfare, since the issues involved related not only to the activities
supported by the PHS, but also to those of the Children's Bureau of the
Welfare Administration and of the Vocational Rehabilitation Administration.
In his reply, Lee wrote that "I do not believe that there is any
disagreement on the principles involved. In my view, the main question
is how to implement the principles and protect the individual against
an invasion of privacy. We believe that this can best be done by a
voluntary cooperative effort." It is readily apparent, then, that
throughout all levels of Government concerned with health affairs—
NIH, PHS, and the upper levels of the Department of Health, Education
and Welfare (DHEW)—there was, by 1965, a manifest concern with respect
to the potential problems of experimenting with human beings and to
the proposition that any proposal regarding the restraint of such-
activity should involve a minimum of federal intervention.
Representative Cornelius E. Gallagher (N.J.), letter to Luther
L. Terry, September 13, 1965.
Philip R. Lee, letter to Representative Cornelius E. Gallagher,
November 22, 1965.
30
The Government's Response
The general question of the ethical, moral and legal aspects
of clinical investigation was discussed with the NAHC at its meeting
on September 28, 1965. Shannon reviewed the issues that had been
discussed by his ad hoc advisory committee and his staff for the Council.
His remarks emphasized the following points: There was a general
awareness on the part of people engaged in clinical research activity
that the present guidelines under which they operated were inadequate.
The problems stemmed from the change in the nature of clinical
investigation. In the past, such investigation was more in the line of
observation and stemmed from the normal physician-patient relationship in
an attempt to find a more accepted treatment. However, observation was
being replaced by manipulation in not only the diseased individual but
also in normal individuals. Shannon stressed that
we have the feeling that since such investigation departs
from the conventional patient-physician relationship,
where the patient's good has been substituted for by the
need to develop new knowledge, that the physician is no
longer in the same relationship that he is in the
conventional medical setting and indeed may not be in a
position to develop a purely or a wholly objective
assessment of the moral nature or the ethical nature of
the act which he proposes to perform. We would think
that if indeed this is the case, that investigative
procedures that depart from those which are purely
therapeutic in nature perhaps might be the subject of
discussion before the fact with the investigator's peers,
so that the environment within which he resides could
reach a sound judgment as to the worthwhileness and to
the validity of the things that he chose to do.
This information has been taken from the Stenographic Transcript of
the National Advisory Health Council Meeting, September 28, 1965 (Hereinafter
referred to as "Transcript, NAHC Meeting"). See n. 50, supra.
68Ibid.
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Shannon told the Council that, while there had been various attempts to
develop codes and declarations, in his opinion they had been produced
to fit the need of very specific circumstances and did not apply
generally. Shannon concluded that he felt that the PHS had
a dual responsibility. One is a minor one of
keeping the Government out of trouble . . . but
really the major one is through these programs to
try to encourage the development of terms and
conditions that will encourage the flourishing of
sound clinical investigation rather than
discouraging it. I am searching for some way of
creating a more profound sense of an institutional
awareness of the importance of this aspect of the
problem without tying them down and immobilizing
them in their capabilities.69
Shannon and his associates hoped that their efforts would help to develop
an institutional framework of review that would become "an integral
part of the working process of biomedical research" and that "all
investigative activity involving a human subject, regardless of the
support, would be reviewed ... as a part of the normal workings of a
good scientific establishment." Shannon also proposed for consideration
by the NAHC a draft resolution which expressed the view that, in research
involving human subjects,
the judgment of the investigator must be subject to
review by his peers to assure an independent
determination of the risk-benefit of the scientific
work involved and maximum protection of the rights
and welfare of the individual or individuals involved.
69Ibid.
70
'Joseph S. Murtaugh, in a letter to this author, October 4, 1971 .
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An arrangement to provide for this review by peers
of proposed clinical investigation should be clearly
provided for in every institution where such work
is conducted.'^
The Council expressed its concern with these issues and agreed that a
restrictive code was not possible or warranted. It expressed a desire
to study carefully the proposed resolution and to discuss it within the
institutional environments of its members with the intent of taking a
definitive stand on the issue in the Council's next meeting in December
1965.
Dr. Dael Wolfle, now Professor of Public Affairs at the
University of Washington and a past member of the NAHC, explains the
attitude of the Council toward the issues before it.
If rules were to be written that would apply
generally over the country they would be either
vague enough to require a good deal of interpretation
or so specific as to try to cover a great variety
of conditions. Neither alternative seemed desirable,
in view of the fact that Federally supported research
involving human subj ects ranges over such a wide
variety of conditions with respect to the kind of
information to be secured from the subject, the
methods of treatment, and possible harm.
Accordingly, we agreed that we should put
the burden of responsibility on the experimenter
and his professional colleagues. We thought the
Government should have more protection than the mere
statement by the principal investigator that his
methods were sound and appropriate. ^
On December 3, 1965, the NAHC adopted a resolution reflecting much
of the earlier work done by Shannon with his advisors and staff. The
Draft Proposal for Discussion, "Resolution of the National Advisory
Health Council on the Exercise of Ethical and Moral Judgment in the Conduct
of Clinical Investigation," September 28, 1965.
72
Dael Wolfle, in a letter to this author, April 7, 1971.
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Council resolved that the
Public Health Service support of clinical
research and investigation involving human beings
should be provided only if the judgment of the
investigator is subject to prior review by his
institutional associates to assure an independent
determination of the protection of the rights
and welfare of the individual or individuals
involved, of the appropriateness of the methods
used to secure informed consent, and of the
risk and potential medical benefits of the
investigation.
The recommendations of the NAHC were accepted by Surgeon
General Stewart; on February 8, 1966, he issued the first official
Policy and Procedure Order (PPO No. 129) outlining the position to be
taken by the PHS regarding clinical research using human subjects.
The PPO maintained that
No new, renewal, or continuation research or research
training grant in support of clinical research and
investigation involving human beings shall be awarded
by the Public Health Service unless the grantee has
indicated in the application the manner in which the
grantee institution will provide prior review of the
judgment of the principal investigator or program
director by a committee of his institutional associates.
This review should assure an independent determination:
(1) of the rights and welfare of the individual or
individuals involved, (2) of the appropriateness of
the methods used to secure informed consent, and (3)
of the risks and potential medical benefits of the
investigation. A description of the committee of
associates who will provide the review shall be included
in the application.
The statement also indicated that the policy applied to "all PHS research
and research training grant regulations and research and research
training policy statements." In addition, assurances of compliance
with the PHS policy were required with each separate grant application.
The general reaction of the research community toward the
policy statement was favorable. "Opposition to the guidelines was
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minimal. There was no doubt that American science was ready for this
type of regulation." Some opposition both of a procedural and
of a substantive nature did develop.
There were behavioral scientists who felt that
this would interfere with their research. They
said how can we possibly find out about people
if we don't ask them these very personal questions.
There is a whole class of studies in social
psychology that depend on deception of the
subjects. This was one issue. Another issue
was that the individual investigator felt that
he was being tied up with more red tape.'^
This opposition had little impact upon the policy-makers and their decision
that such guidelines were required.
Once it was realized that the policy was necessary
it was issued because we felt that we were going
to the Congress to obtain money for certain types
of investigation and we had a responsibility to
see that amenities relative to the protection of
individuals were not placed in jeopardy.'^
Experience with administering the policy, however, led by July
1, 1966, to a major revision. A memorandum from Dr. Mordecai Gordon of
the Division of Research Grants to the Assistant General Counsel, DREW,
describes the major administrative problem. "The most frequent apparent
misunderstanding is reflected in the submission of an assurance for an
institution as a whole instead of for each application." As a result of
73Interview with James A. Shannon.
Interview with Mordecai Gordon, former Special Assistant to the
Director, Division of Research Grants, National Institutes of Health,
Bethesda, Maryland, April 27, 1971.
Interview with James A. Shannon.
Mordecai Gordon, Memorandum to Assistant General Counsel, Department
of Health, Education and Welfare, "Clinical Research and Investigation
Involving Human Beings," April 18, 1966.
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this feedback, PPO No. 129, Revised Policy, eliminated the requirement
of individual assurances of compliance with each grant application and
provided instead for an institution-wide assurance to cover all subsequent
grant proposals. The assurances were to include (1) agreement with
the principles of the policy; (2) a description of the method of review;
(3) the competencies represented in the review committee; (4) the
administrative mechanism for surveillance and advice; and (5) the manner
in which the institution would assure itself that the advice of the
committee would be followed. In addition to resolving significant
administrative problems, the single institution-wide assurance had
another purpose. In their attempt to develop an institutional framework
of review which would encompass all investigative activity involving
human subjects, NIH officials "hoped that the use of a single but
institutionally oriented assurance would, in most, if not in all situations,
stimulate consideration also of reviews by a similar process of projects
not supported by PHS grants." The revision also extended the necessity
for peer group review of research using human subjects to all PHS
grants and required the institutions to report any changes in policy,
procedures, or in the composition of review committees.
In the month prior to the issuance of the revised PPO No. 129,
Dr. Henry K. Beecher published an article in which he cited 22 examples
of experiments using human subjects which involved serious ethical
problems. Beecher wrote that
^John F. Sherman, Deputy Director, NIH, in a letter to this author,
November 5, 1971.
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Evidence is at hand that many of the patients in
the examples to follow never had the risk satisfactorily
explained to them, and it seems obvious that further
hundreds have not known that they were the subject of
an experiment although grave consequences have been
suffered as a direct result of experiments described
here.78
While the article created quite an uproar in the medical research
community, there is little doubt that the momentum to prevent such
ethical errors was already strong within the PHS. If any problem did
exist it was to find, to repeat an earlier statement by Shannon, "some way
of creating a more profound sense of an institutional awareness of the
importance" of the ethical and moral aspects of experimenting with man.
The PHS Guidelines were an attempt to attain that objective.
On December 12, 1966, the Surgeon General, in order to clarify
past statements as they related to the behavioral and social sciences,
issued another policy statement. As indicated earlier, some investigators
had complained that fully informed consent was impossible in much
research, particularly in those cases involving psychological factors.
The December clarification made it clear that the Guidelines applied to
experiments of a behavioral or sociological nature, but PHS officials
"tried to introduce into the clarification a little common sense. We
tried to leave some leeway for judgments by both the investigators and the
review committees."
The clarifying statement also noted that there were some studies
in the behavioral sciences that "did not require the fully informed
78Henry K. Beecher, "Ethics and Clinical Research," The New England
Journal of Medicine, vol. 274, June 16, 1966, p. 1354.
79Interview with Mordecai Gordon.
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consent of the subject or even his knowledgeable participation." The
clarification made clear the responsibility of the grantee institution
to assure that experiments were "in accordance with the laws of the
community in which the investigations are conducted and for giving due
consideration to pertinent ethical issues." It also stressed concern
for the protection of the subject as "most critical when the subject is
not of age or competence to make an adequate judgment in his own behalf."
On January 24, 1967, the Surgeon General issued a further
80
revision of the July 1, 1966 statement. The primary purpose of this
revision was to enunciate clearly the responsibility of the PHS:
Nothing in this institution-wide assurance should inhibit the
PHS staff, advisory groups, or consultants from (1) identifying
concern for the welfare of human subjects, and communicating
this concern to the grantee institution, or (2) recommending
disapproval of the application if the gravity of the hazards
and risks so indicate.
The final major policy revision to be discussed in this paper
was issued on May 1, 1969. The primary reason for this revision was the
perceived need both to strengthen previous policy statements and to assure
a greater consistency in interpreting and implementing their provisions.
It was on the basis of our experience with administering the
policy that, for one thing, PPO No. 129 originally saw the
light of day in February 1966, and over a period of months
after that was revised and supplemented and pieced and patched
together so many times that it became almost incoherent. So
there was a need to put all of the policy in one pot, so to
speak.81
80PPO No. 129, Revised Supplement No. 3, January 24, 1967.
81Interview with Mark H. Conner, Institutional Relations Office,
Division of Research Grants, Bethesda, Maryland, February 16, 1971.
38
On July 24, 1968, Dr. Philip Lee appointed a Task Force of various PHS-NIH
officials to review and revise the guidelines for the protection of the
individual as a research subject. The initial meeting of the Task Force
was held on October 28, 1968. Eighteen months later, in a letter to the
heads of institutions receiving PHS grants, the chairman of the Task
Force summarized the group's findings. "The review confirmed the utility
of the policy, but recommended changes in the policy statement to provide
Q O
better understanding of the requirements."
The changes were more procedural than substantive. The revised
policy statement, Protection Of The Individual As A Research Subject, once
again emphasized that protecting the rights and welfare of human subjects
was a responsibility of the grantee institution. Specifically, the
policy required that a review committee within each institution be concerned
primarily with: (1) the rights and welfare of the individual, (2) the
appropriateness and adequacy of methods used to obtain informed consent
from the subject, and (3) the risks and potential benefits of the investigation.
It was made clear that the Guidelines applied to all research involving
human subjects, whether concerned with medical or behavioral studies.
The most significant change from the criterion enumerated in prior policy
statements was in criterion (3),
which recognized that direct benefits to subjects could be
other than medical, and that the importance of the knowledge
to be gained might justify a committee in permitting an informed
subject to accept risks in the interests to humanity, even
though there was no direct benefit to him.
82Eugene A. Confrey, Former Director, Division of Research Grants,
National Institutes of Health, letter to Heads of Institutions Receiving
PHS Grants, May 1, 1969.
83
Donald T. Chalkley, letter to Mrs. Lindsey Miller Lerman, Center
for Criminal Justice, Harvard Law School, January 25, 1971.
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There were two other important changes. The policy provided
a more detailed description of what constituted "consent." It stipulated
that for minors or other legally incompetent persons, consent could be
obtained from parents, guardians or next of kin. The policy stated that
"such consent is valid, however, only if the individual is given a fair
explanation of the procedures to be followed, their benefits and attendant
hazards and discomforts, and the reasons for pursuing the research and
its general objectives." It made clear that the subject "may withdraw
his consent at any time." This represented, by far, the greatest
amplification of the term "consent" on the part of PHS officials. The
other important change was of a procedural nature. It required certification
of the review of individual applications. The July 1, 1966 policy revision
had required that each application had been or would be reviewed by the
institutional review committee. "This requirement was dropped in March
1967, on the insistence of some institutions that this was a bothersome
requirement." It was the opinion of the Task Force, however, that in
order to prevent any problems from arising concerning the PHS's recognition
that the institution was aware that the experiment involved human subjects,
such certification should once again be required. "Our intent, therefore,
was to provide a device that would enable an awarding unit within the PHS
to be certain that the institution had in fact recognized that human
85
subjects were involved in a particular proposal."
"^Interview with Donald T. Chalkley.
85Idem.
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It might be helpful at this juncture to summarize the major
provisions of the Guidelines:
1. Broad guidelines, rather than detailed controls, are provided.
2. There are three basic guidelines:
a. the protection of the rights and welfare of the individual,
b. the judgment of methods used to obtain informed consent,
c. the determination of the risks and potential benefits
of the investigation.
3. Compliance with these guidelines is accomplished by submitting
an institution-wide assurance for all projects funded by the PHS.
The institution is not required to adopt a specific set of ethical
principles as long as its methods and procedures conform to the
relevant principles outlined in the PHS Guidelines.
4. A system of self-regulation is established in the institutions
funded by the PHS. This does not imply, however, a passive
attitude on the part of the PHS. The Service retains its
responsibility for a final overview of all research proposals.
5. Supervision of the Guidelines is vested in a review panel
of the peers of the investigator within his own institution.
Members of the panel cannot have a. vested interest in any project
that they review.
6. The committee review is not to be an independent review of
the Guidelines for protecting the research subject. Rather it
is a review of the judgment of the investigator and his methods
for complying with the Guidelines. In this manner, the PHS
places the primary responsibility for designing and carrying
out the research project on the investigator.
7. The PHS has refrained from rigorously defining such terms
as "informed consent," "rights and welfare of human subjects,"
and "invasion of privacy." However, it has attempted to provide
the review committees, particularly in the May 1, 1969 statement,
with a frame of reference for reaching a consensus regarding
the meaning of such terms.
Rapid advances in biomedical science and the increase in the
use of human subjects in research experiments have resulted in enormous
benefits to the health of this nation. Such progress, however, has also
brought into focus various ethical and social problems related to the
use of human beings as research subjects. Instances such as the Southam-
Mandel case and those cited by Beecher provided ample evidence that the
problems are real. In response to these developments, the PHS has felt
it necessary to review its responsibility in the area of clinical research
and to determine the course of action that such responsibility required.
There were a variety of interests involved: among them the research
subject, the clinical investigator, and the general public. The crucial
question was how to balance those interests, weighing both the objectives
being sought and the values held by key groups in society. This portion
of the study has attempted to trace the evolution of the PHS's answer
to that question. Whether well or badly done, government officials
did define their responsibility and proceeded on a course of action
designed to fulfill that responsibility. To explain why those officials
defined their responsibility as they did and why they took a particular
course of action may provide valuable insights into the policy-making
process used to approach a very complex and sensitive problem.
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PART II: THE P.H.S. GUIDELINES:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE POLICY-MAKING PROCESS
Government exists precisely for the
reason that there is a need to have
special persons in society charged
with the function of promoting and
protecting the public interest. "
Paul Appleby
Big Democracy, 1945
The PHS Guidelines are the result of an effort by one agency
of the government to protect and promote the public interest and to
maintain the delicate balance between the welfare of the research subject
and the expansion of medical research. In this specific case there
existed a point of tension between these two objectives with respect to
medical experimentation on human subjects, since procedures to be used for
the benefit of man must first be tested on human beings. There have
been instances when investigators, who have justified their action by
the need to promote research, have disregarded the welfare of the individual.
Clearly, there has been a conflict between two values, both strongly held
in American society. The task which confronted government policy-makers,
themselves former scientists, was to resolve that conflict without
excessively sacrificing either the welfare of the individual or the benefits
to be gained from future research. The comments of a past member of the
NAHC illustrate the dilemma:
Some of us felt regretful at the necessity of writing an additional
rule or regulation . . . for what we were doing was to impose one
more "bureaucratic" restriction. However, we thought the
"restriction" necessary, both in order to protect subjects
against occasional lapses from good practice and also to assure
Congress and the public that good practice was always to be
insisted upon. '
86Paul Appleby, Big Democracy (N.Y.: Alfred A. Knopf, 1945), p. 5.
87Dael Wolfle, in a letter to this author.
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The purpose of this part of the study is to analyze the policy-
making process outlined in Part I. That analysis will be based on an
eclectic framework of various concepts of policy-making, drawn primarily
from the literature of the social sciences. Within this framework, an
attempt will be made to explain why the PHS Guidelines took the form that
they did.
On the most basic level the Guidelines which resulted can best
be explained in the context of what Amitai Etzioni refers to as a "mixed-
scanning strategy." In such a strategy, policy-makers differentiate
fundamental decisions from what Etzioni terms "bit decisions." Fundamental
decisions
are made through an exploration of the main alternatives seen
by the actor in view of his conception of his goals, but . . .
details and specifications are omitted so that overviews are
feasible. Bit decisions are made "incrementally" but within
the contexts set by fundamental decisions.
It is the fundamental decisions, then, that set the basic direction of
policy and it is the incremental or bit decisions that are made either
to implement those basic decisions or to revise them. Etzioni also
suggests that "the cumulative value of the incremental decisions is
greatly affected by the underlying fundamental decisions." The
decisions by the PHS in the mid-1960's to assume formal responsibility
in an area theretofore void of government involvement and to adopt a
particular course of action represent such fundamental policy decisions.
Actions subsequent to those decisions were for the most part attempts
00
°°Amitai Etzioni, The Active Society (N.Y.: The Free Press, 1968),
p. 283.
89Ibid.
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by policy-makers to implement through bit decisions their initial decisions
more effectively.
The most important task confronting the policy-makers in developing
the PHS Guidelines was, to use Yehezkel Dror's concept, the "processing of
values." According to Dror, "values can be mutually independent, mutually
reinforcing, contradictory or anywhere in between. In their 'raw' form,
they are not very useful for evaluating problems or formulating goals for
public policymaking . . . values should be specified at least enough to
point out the main avenues of action and some rough priorities for them,
including the basic values that must hot be impaired."'^ Prior to the
1960's, there was no formal policy by the PHS regarding research involving
human subjects in its extramural program and there was no formal attempt
to specify and to order values according to some scale of priorities so
that such a policy might be established. That the PHS did not have such
a policy by this time is not very surprising. The rationale underlying
the lack of an explicit policy included, as this author views it, two
major considerations. First, the problem was so complex that caution
was generally accepted as the best way to appeoach the question of federal
involvement. One authority felt that
it is not my view that many rules can be laid down to govern
experimentation in man. In most cases, these are likely to
do harm than good . . . legal development can be helpful and
directed toward progress or can be harmfully restrictive.
Which it shall be will be determined by the breadth of
understanding expended on this complex subject.^2
90Yehezkel Dror, Public Policymaking Reexamiried (Pennsylvania:
Chandler Publishing Co., 1968), pp. 164-66 contain a detailed explanation
of this phase of policy-making.
91Ibid.. pp. 164 and 165.
92Henry K. Beecher, "Experimentation in Man, Journal of the American
Medical Association, vol. 169, January 1959, p. 471.
Hence, if there was to be a fundamental change in policy it would have
tended to evolve over a period of time, rather than to appear suddenly.
The evolutionary process was well along by the start of the 1960's. The
second factor which helped to determine the PHS's aloof stance on the
issue of research guidelines was the traditional concept of the purpose
of a research grant and of the inherent nature of scientific research.
The traditional grant is essentially string free. This was
true in the early days of the National Cancer Institute pro-
gram which started in 1937. The extramural program . . . has
repeatedly emphasized the need of the Federal Government to
disengage itself from direct control of the grant in any way.
It was the feeling that it would not be in keeping with the
traditions of scientific freedom for the government to exert
any degree of control over the conduct of the work.93
This "was a very strong tradition within the PHS . . . the limited approach
in the clinical research field was due largely to this tradition."9^ These
two factors—the complexity and uncertainty surrounding the problem and the
traditional concept of the research grant—help explain the early attitude
of the PHS. However, views and values of policy-makers frequently change
as new experiences with a problem or a policy shed light on what is possible
and desirable, and such was the case with respect to this policy issue as
the 1960's unfolded.
Dror has written that "an intuitive awareness of 'problems' can be
consciously cultivated by introspection and by systematically surveying
subjectively-felt problems by means of, for instance, brainstorming sessions
and panel discussions.1 ^ Certainly the efforts of Shannon and his staff
93Interview with Donald T. Chalkley.
'^ Interview with Edward J. Rourke.
95Dror, pp. cit., p. 170.
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and the Livingston group represent mechanisms for the introspection and
surveying cited by Dror. It was because of the meetings and discussions
held by these groups that government officials came to realize in a con-
crete way that the expansion of the NIH clinical research program and the
growth of new and complex medical procedures made the absence of some type
of government policy no longer tolerable.
The basic force behind the Guidelines was an internal perception
of the problem, arising out of the growing awareness that we had
cultivated an investigative capability, particularly in the surgi-
cal area, that now presented a whole new set of issues in terms
of the extent to which individuals could be submitted to that
kind of capability for experimental and research purposes.'&
As an outgrowth of this recognition, two important considerations became
of central importance. First, it became apparent that the judgment of the
investigator was "not sufficient as a basis for reaching a conclusion
concerning the ethical and moral set of questions in that relationship."''
Second, it became clear that it was necessary to clarify the responsibility
of the NIH "as a supporting agency and to identify the courses of action
Q ftthat that responsibility" imposed. Implicit but inherent in these two
interrelated considerations was the fundamental decision to intervene, to
whatever degree was found necessary and desirable, in the research programs
of institutions whose projects were funded by the PHS. Shannon, with reference
to the PHS Guidelines, declares that "as soon as we decided that other
institutions were not behaving responsibly as we felt that we should behave
then it was inevitable that this development would come. "99 The next
^Interview with Joseph S. Murtaugh.
97Idem.
QQShannon, Memorandum to Livingston,
"interview with James A. Shannon.
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important decision to be made was to determine the direction that such
intervention would take. It was in this stage of the policy-making
process that the "processing of values" assumed such an important/role.
Since this was so it might be useful at this point to discuss
the concept of the "processing of values." Values are the principles by
which one establishes priorities of importance among needs, demands and
goals. The growth of new and complex medical procedures presented a whole
new set of issues with respect to securing protection for the research sub-
ject without immobilizing the clinical investigator. Policy-makers realized
that, as techniques of medical research became more sophisticated, the pro-
blems they now experienced would become more complex. The nature and degree
of this complexity was unclear to them, nevertheless they believed that
their most important task was to determine how the best possible balance
between the welfare of the research subject and the requirements of medical
research could be assured.
The obvious difficulty for policy-makers in this case was determining
"the best possible balance" for all situations at all times in the future.
The difficulty was very real, since what may be highly valued in one circumstance
might be of only minor concern in another circumstance. Another important
variable was that, as man's capability for doing and evaluating medical
research increases, his practical information about certain experimental
procedures will also increase, resulting in possible changes in the risks/
benefits ratio. Thus as more or different factual information is obtained,
there will be a greater tendency for a shift in those values viewed as
relevant to attacking an explicit problem. Frequently, goals are altered
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in light of both a change in available means and of a change in the
cost of achieving an objective. Of course, one can also view the decision-
making process as beginning first with a shift in values which then
affects the design of policies and the role played by certain facts. Even
during one particular point in time "we must deal continually with conflicts
of value, where one person's gain is another's loss.1 °° The ordering of
priorities will differ among individuals, with one willing to sacrifice some
value at the expense of another while another person remains unwilling to
make the same sacrifice. Hence, the crucial problem for decision-makers
arises "from multiplicity and fluidity of values and from social dis-
agreement about values. "•*• Thus, it'is not realistic to expect a precise
and permanent ordering of values when a variety of persons and institutions
are involved in the decision-making process.
There appear to have been five basic values articulated by the
policy-makers which played an important role in the decision-making process.
Each of these values were included in what Dror designates as the "basic values
that must not be impaired." First, there was the strongly-held belief that
no man had the right to risk the health and welfare of another human being
without his knowledge and consent. This was apparent from the very beginning
of the NIH attempt to assess the environment of clinical research. Shannon,
in his request to Livingston to inquire into the existing state of clinical
100Victor A. Thompson, Decision Theory, Pure and Applied (1971
General Learning Corporation), p. 7.
101Charles E. Lindblom and David Braybrooke, A Strategy of Decision;
Policy Evaluation As A Social Process (London: Collier MacMillan, Ltd.,
1963), p. 113.
investigation, expressed the desire for a mechanism that would "serve as
some protection for the individual who submitted to these research procedures."-'-^
Second, there was the belief in the impropriety of excessive government
involvement. Dr. Eugene A. Confrey suggests that "surveillance by the Federal
Government of research procedures and their ethical implications relating
to tens of thousands of grants and contracts is ... infeasible, to say
nothing of its propriety."1"3 while although the management of such a task
was viewed as impracticable, it was the excessive surveillance by the
Federal Government that was presumed to be improper and this was a crucial
factor in determining the substance of the policy. This value judgment
provided the basis for the next one. The policy-makers valued the importance
of cooperation between the PHS, the institution, and the individual investigator.
This value judgment was widely supported throughout all levels of the
bureaucracy. There were three parties involved in this cooperating effort.
Since the investigator designed the research, he was in the best position
to evaluate the propriety of his procedures. However, "the investigator
is first and foremost a scientist in search of new knowledge, and it would
not be in accord with our understanding of human motivation to expect him
always to beasvigilant for his subject's welfare as for the productiveness
of his own research." ^ Thus, recognition was given to "the institution . . .
[as] the proper agent for overseeing research programs involving human subjects."
102interview with James A. Shannon.
103Eugene A. Confrey, "PHS Grant-Supported Research With Human Subjects,"
U.S. Public Health Reports, vol. 83, February 1968, pp. 127-33.
Off ice of Science and Technology, Privacy and Behavioral Research
(Washington, B.C.: GPO, February ]967), pp. 5-6.
105Confrey, "PHS Grant-Supported Research," op. cit.
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The third party and spokesman for the public was the sponsoring agency. The
agency was responsible for assuring that the investigator and his institution
were cognizant of the importance of the ethical aspects of the proposed
research and that they had done what was necessary to protect the welfare of
the research subject. The fourth value considered by the policy-makers was
the conviction that the diversity inherent in scientific research was
desirable. They believed that the preservation of such diverse research
precluded either a too broad or a too restrictive policy. Dael Wolfle
expressed this belief earlier when he wrote that
neither alternative seemed desirable, in view of the fact that
Federally supported research involving human subjects ranges
over such a wide variety of conditions with respect to the kind
of information to be secured from the subject, the methods of
treatment, and possible harm.
Hence, there was no attempt on the part of the government to apply common
rules to diverse situations. The policy-makers also valued highly the
grant-oriented program, which they believed was of a special nature. This
fifth value was, in part, held over from earlier years when the need was
emphasized for "the Federal Government to disengage itself from direct
control of the grant in any way." Policy-makers still found it improper
for the Government to constrain the investigator in his search for knowledge.
The agency has not contracted for a tangible product, to be
produced under rigorously specified terms and conditions. On
the contrary, a grant is interpreted as a form of financial
assistance to an institution on behalf of an investigator
so that he may pursue a problem in which he is interested
and which coincides with an area of biomedical research relating
106Interview with Donald T. Chalkley.
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to a national objective. Given this concept, the agency will
endeavor to optimize the conditions conducive to the advancement
of knowledge, including maximal freedom of inquiry.
These, then, were the five basic values processed by the policy-makers and
subsequently incorporated into the resolution promulgated by the NAHC
on December 3, 1965. This resolution represents a fundamental decision in
Etzioni's terms. The Council gave policy-makers the "broader concurrence"10
they thought necessary to effectuate their policy aims. The use of such a
mechanism reflects what Dror has identified as the "organizational and
social distance between the units" involved in policy-making. Such distance
is necessary, according to Dror, in order that the units "operate at high
quality" so that a policy will have a better opportunity to succeed.
The policy-makers agreed that
it was much more important for an external group to make pro-
nouncements that are going to be restrictive on themselves
as they appear as professionals within an institution than for
us as federal bureaucrats ... to enunciate a restrictive
policy.110
The Guidelines which subsequently evolved were a result of an effort by
policy-makers to bring form and direction to their basic values in order to
achieve their overall goal. That goal was to develop a mechanism that
would both protect and promote the interests of the American people, and
that would neither sacrifice the welfare of the individual nor deny the
nation the benefits which would accrue from future research. In order to
107Confrey, "PHS Grant-Supported Research," op. cit.
l°8interview with Joseph S. Murtaugh.
109Dror, op. cit., p. 211.
Interview with James A. Shannon.
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develop a policy that would assure optimum protection of human subjects
as well as achieve the goals of research, a consensus developed among
policy-makers that a detailed code of ethics that "did not apply generally"111
was neither practical nor desirable. Restrictions that might be warranted
in a particular situation might be unjustified in another. The policy-
makers reasoned, therefore, that "such control would be likely to inhibit,
"I 1 O
delay and distort the carrying out of research." ^ In their attempts to
design a workable policy, within the context of their five basic values,
the policy-makers were able to decide upon the basic direction that the
Guidelines were to take: primary responsibility for executing the policy
would reside at the local level. Of course, through the PHS-NIH review
process federal officials maintained their responsibility of final judgment
of all research proposals. It seems fair to conclude that in the case of
this particular policy the five basic values specified by policy-makers formed
the framework in which all later fundamental and incremental policy decisions
were made. The construction of such a framework was an essential step
because of the important role played by values in determining policy objectives,
the kinds of implementing mechanisms that could be established to achieve
them, and the resulting degree of success. General agreement among policy-
makers regarding basic values remained constant throughout this decision-
making process, but, as Dror writes, "values can be specified and ordered to
1;L1Shannon, Transcript, NAHC Meeting.
T. Chalkley, "Intent and Experience in the implementation
of PHS Regulations Concerning Projects Involving Human Subjects," speech
before the American Psychological Association, San Francisco, California,
August 31, 1968.
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various degrees" and what is required on this continuum "depends very
much on the particular policy that has to be made. "H•* Since value
considerations are intertwined with cognitive considerations and since
both considerations may vary with changing conditions, policy-makers
often choose to effect new policies through incremental changes. Incre-
mental policy-making "proceeds through a sequence of approximations. A
policy is directed at a problem; it is tried, altered, and tried in its
altered form, altered again, and so forth." Dael Wolfle indicated in
a statement cited earlier that "research involving human subjects ranges
over a wide variety of conditions with respect to the kind of information
to be secured from the subject, the methods of treatment, and possible harm."
It was unreasonable, therefore, to expect an accurate forecast of those
myriad of conditions. The incremental approach to decision-making focuses
on margins or increments of change so that only small changes from the
status quo are evaluated. The approach is "deliberately exploratory. Rather
than attempting to foresee all of the consequences of various alternate
routes, one route is tried, and the unforeseen consequences are left to
be discovered and treated by subsequent increments. "H-> Any attempt to
go beyond this,suggests Charles E. Lindblom, is usually unrealistic and
perhaps unwise; policy-makers possess neither the knowledge to predict
future outcomes, nor are they able to reach agreement on the ordering of
the various values involved. Thus, by making policy decisions incrementally,
!13Dror, op. cit., pp. 164 and 165.
Lindblom and Braybrooke, op. cit., p. 73
115Etzioni, op. cit., p. 271.
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variations in values and the degree to which they are valued by policy-
makers, as well as new factual information, can more easily be incorporated
into the decision-making process. As will be shown later, the policy
revisions made subsequent to the initial and fundamental policy decisions
to intervene and to intervene in a particular fashion reflected only incre-
mental differences in the ranking of priorities rather than any deviation
from the commitment to the primary values held by the policy-makers throughout
the process under study.
Since the initial policy statement of February 8, 1966, represents
the basic form of the Guidelines, it will be useful to examine that statement
in light of the original decision made by the policy-makers concerning
the direction that the policy would take. For the purposes of this analysis,
it is important to see if the initial statement, as well as subsequent
statements, reflect Etzioni's contention that "the cumulative value of the
s
incremental decisions is greatly affected by the underlying fundamental
decisions." Perhaps the most important substantive point in the initial state-
ment was the requirement that each grantee institution provide for "prior
review of the judgment of the principal investigator or program director by
a committee of his institutional associates." This requirement was certainly
consistent with the second through fifth values held by the policy-makers.
It represents an attempt to avoid an unnecessarily restrictive "exercise of
federal responsibility" and to create an "institutional awareness"
1
 Curran, op. cit., p. 439.
1-^Shannon, Transcript. NAHC Meeting.
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regarding the responsibility of the institution to promote a favorable
environment for clinical research. If the primary responsibility for over-
seeing experimental procedures was to rest with the individual institutions,
their review committees and their investigators, it was necessary for the
policy-makers to instill the values underlying the overall policy into
those review committees and scientists. This attitude was clearly expressed
by one of the policy-makers: "We must use every opportunity in a continuing
campaign of education among the grantees that . . . the grantee institution
must accept and discharge in a forthright manner its responsibility for
both scientific and administrative overview of grant-supported activities
by its faculty or staff. I® Recognizing the diversity involved in
clinical research, NIH officials sought to encourage the local review com-
mittee to solve their own problems. "We realized that we ... couldn't
possibly ride herd on the multiple situations that would arise. Our
responsibility was satisfied if we were convinced that the individual
institution within which the research took place had an adequate review
mechanism. "•LJ-^
The review committees were given the responsibility to determine:
(1) the rights and welfare of the individual involved; (2) the appropriate-
ness of the methods used to secure informed consent; and (3) the risks and
potential medical benefits of the investigation. Dror asserts that "policy-
making must . . . often leave the concrete definitions of the policy to be
•'•l°John Sherman, Memorandum to members of the Interbureau Advisory
Committee for Extramural Programs, National Institutes of Health, "State-
ment of Assurance With Respect to Clinical Investigation," January 23, 1966.
•^Interview with James A. Shannon.
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determined when it is applied to discrete issues during its execution."120
Recognizing the diversity of research and the variety of situations that
might arise, the policy-makers chose not to define rigorously these three
responsibilities, but instead left their definition to the review committees.
A good example of this aspect of the process is the policy-makers' attitude
toward the meaning of "informed consent." The requirement that the investi-
gator obtain the consent of his subject prior to initiating the experimental
procedure was consistent with the belief that the subject be assured adequate
protection. That requirement was equally consistent, however, with the other
four principal values. Because of the absence of legal precedent and of the
variety of possible interpretations of the meaning of informed consent,
government officials refrained from developing a rigorous definition for it.
"We had great debates over informed consent. The lawyers repeatedly said
that there was very little legal precedent in law and, therefore, no real
legal interpretation of informed consent. We did not think it was possible
101to construct a law. . . on informed consent.1 For the policy-makers to
attempt such a construction might have meant the obstruction of future
research and would certainly have violated the philosophy of a grant-
operated support program, both important values. At the same time, however,
"informed consent" was viewed as an important mechanism for which to strive
and was, therefore, to be considered in any decision concerning a research
project.
120Dror, op. cit.. p. 191.
H. Stewart, in a letter to this author.
57
Government officials were then confronted with the decision of
how to determine whether or not the grantee institution had such a review
mechanism. Once again, consistent with the principles of minimal federal
encroachment and maximum local involvement, the decision was to require
each institution to submit an assurance of compliance for any research
project funded by the PHS. The assurance mechanism was designed to secure
policy objectives and was selected within the context of the original
fundamental decisions. In a similar fashion, examination of subsequent
policy revisions will show that the incremental changes made between February
1966 and May 1969, were consistent with the original set of value premises
articulated by the policy-makers. The first major revision was issued on
July 1, 1966. Important to note, in light of Etzioni's framework for the
analysis of policy-making, is that this revision did not include any sub-
stantive changes from the original policy statement. The most significant
change was of a procedural nature—the replacement of the grant-by-grant •
assurances of compliance with an institution-wide assurance to cover all
grant proposals. The change was made in order to implement original policy
decisions more effectively, not to modify them. Etzioni explains the place
of such implementing mechanisms in the policy-making process; he writes that
"the decision-making and implementation processes . . . are closely inter-
woven, with decisions affecting implementations . . . Decision-making is
hence not to be viewed as a passive process. There is a continual give-and-
take between decision-making and implementation."-'-^ The give-and-take of
which Etzioni writes is made possible by the response of the policy-makers
l22Etzioni, op. cit., p. 303.
58
to feedback received from those executing the policy. Karl Deutsch
writes that "in feedback processes . . . the system itself is not isolated
from its environment but, on the contrary, depends for its functioning upon
a constant-stream of information from the environment.1 The importance
of recognizing and reacting to such feedback was realized by the policy-
makers. At the conclusion of his policy statement of July 1, 1966, Surgeon
General Stewart wrote that he would "be pleased to receive suggestions and
information from officials and investigators of grantee institutions to
assist the Service in the conduct of its study." That such feedback was
heeded by the policy-makers is evident in statements such as that of December
12, 1966, which reflected "the advice of the American Psychological Association
and the American Sociological Association."124 Xn that policy statement,
Surgeon General Stewart made it clear that there were some experiments that
"did not require the fully informed consent of the subject or even his
knowledgeable participation." However, the statement remained consistent
with the basic values held by the policy-makers and their original fundamental
policy decisions since it placed the responsibility to assure that experiments
were "in accordance" with local laws and reflected consideration of "pertinent
ethical issues"-'-^
 on the grantee institution.
123Karl Deutsch, The Nerves of Government (N.Y.: The Free Press, 1966),
pp. 186-87.
M. Allen, former Grants Policy Officer, Office of the Surgeon
General, Memorandum to Bureau Chiefs, December 16, 1966.
125PPO, 129, Revised Supplement No. 2, December 12, 1966.
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The policy revision of January 24, 1967, restated the responsibility Of
the PHS. Dror writes that "some 'motivation' must be introduced for executing
the policy, which includes...'pushing' the executing. ^" By emphasizing that
the PHS was prepared to disapprove of an application "if the gravity of the
127hazards and risks so indicate," the policy-makers expressed their intent
to assure the implementation of their original policy decisions.
The final major policy revision was issued on May 1, 1969. Once again,
the changes were primarily procedural rather than substantive. On the basis
of feedback from the individual institutions and their investigators, policy-
makers realized the need to "put all of the policy in one pot"-1-2" in order
to remove any confusion that may have arisen. An attempt was also made to
amplify the meaning of "informed consent." At the same time, however, the
revised policy insisted that primary responsibility for determining whether
129
or not a "fair explanation" had been given to the subject remained with
the institutional review committees. One policy-maker explained, "We have
never insisted on particulars. We have described in general what our conception
of informed consent means. We can only offer suggestions and remind people of
their obligations to the people that they experiment on."- " This revision,
like the ones preceding it, was basically an incremental decision designed to
implement the initial policy decisions. In all instances of policy-making
126Dror, op. cit., p. 188.
127PPO No. 129, Revised Supplement No. 3, January 24, 1967.
128
Interview with Mark H. Conner.
129
Protection Of The Individual As A Research Subject, p. 3.
130Interview with Mark H. Conner.
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subsequent to formulation of the original policy, none of the revisions
violated any of the fundamental value premises articulated by the policy-
makers. Such incremental revisions were made "within .the contexts set by
fundamental decisions" and demonstrated the effect on them of those underlying
fundamental decisions.
The PHS Guidelines were not a result of hastily-made decisions. The
initial policy statement was developed over a period of years, during which
time policy-makers set forth their basic values as a framework within which
to evolve subsequent decisions. In order to fulfill their responsibility
as a public agency as well as their responsibility as the chief supporter of
medical research in the United States, NIH policy-makers sought to develop
guidelines that would provide adequate protection for the research subject as
well as bring into fruition the benefits to be gained from clinical research.
The various mechanisms for executing the policy were not immediately clear.
Confronted with the task of deciding upon the basic direction that their
efforts would take, the policy-makers chose an approach of decentralized
regulation, one consistent with their processed values. Subsequent revisions,
products of the evaluation of feedback from those primarily responsible for
executing the policy, were instituted in order to achieve original policy
decisions.
The decision-making process used to develop the Guidelines is a good
illustration of Etzioni's "mixed-scanning strategy." After fixing their
basic values, the policy-makers proceeded with an "exploration of the main
alternatives"—a detailed code or flexible guidelines, local versus national
control—omitting details so that an overview of the alternatives was
possible. The nature of subsequent policy decisions and the processes em-
ployed to make them also gives credibility to Etzioni's contention that
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"the cumulative value of the incremental decisions is greatly affected by
the underlying fundamental decisions."
The "mixed-scanning strategy," which employs', elements of both comprehen-
sive planning and incremental decision-making, must be considered when
evaluating public policy-making. While it proposes that decision-makers
formulate long-term goals and examine various alternative policies, it also
recognizes the inherent limitations of policy-makers. "The likelihood that
decisions can accomplish large social changes and, at the same time, be
guided by a high level of intellectual comprehension of the problem is slim.
Such decisions require prodigious feats of synoptic analysis, beyond human
131
capacities." Each of the two elements in the "mixed-scanning strategy"
—fundamental and incremental decision-making—help to neutralize the short-
coming of the other. The strategy permits a flexible response to the results
of policy decisions, but does so within the context of broader policy
considerations. Etzioni contends that
societal decision-making requires two sets of mechanisms:
(a) a high-order, fundamental policy-making process which
sets basic directions, and (b) an incremental process which
prepares for fundamental decisions and revises them after
they have been reached. -^
This case study suggests that, at the federal level, these two mechanisms may
be an integral part of the policy-making process.
131Lindblom and Braybrooke, op. cit., p. 65,
132Etzioni, op. cit., p. 290.
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AFTERWORD
During the time that this paper was being prepared, the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare announced the adoption of a new policy!-"
governing research using human subjects. The policy is no longer restricted
to the health field, but instead applies to all programs and activities
supported by grants or contracts from the Department and in which the subjects
may be at risk.
The new department-wide policy closely parallels the PHS Guidelines
issued in May 1969. Perhaps the most important divergence in the new policy
concerns the requirements for informed consent. The basic elements of informed
consent are enumerated fully and clearly in the new policy. Furthermore, the
policy requires that the procedure used to obtain informed consent and the
basis for committee determinations that the procedures are adequate are to be
fully documented. The documentation may follow one of three forms:
(1) The "provision of a written consent document embodying all of the basic
elements of informed consent" which must "be signed by the subject or his
authorized representative;" (2) the "provision of a 'short' form written
consent document indicating that the basic elements of informed consent have
been presented orally to the subject." This form is to "be signed by the
subject or his authorized representative and an auditor-witness to the oral
presentation and to the subject's or his authorized representative's signature;"
133
Chapter 1-40, "Protection of Human Subjects," Department of Health,
Education and Welfare Grants Administration Manual, April 15, 1971.
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(3) the "modification of either of the above two primary procedures"
which "must be approved by the [institutional review] committee." While
the latter alternative provides much the same freedom of action permitted
under earlier versions of the policy, a greater burden is on the review
committee to document its agreement to a particular consent procedure.
The greater the departure from fully informed prior written consent, the
greater the burden on the committee. This procedure is consistent with
the PHS policy's emphasis on decentralized regulation, with primary
responsibility resting with the research institution. At the same time,
however, it represents a larger degree of involvement by the Federal Govern-
ment. By placing this greater burden on the institutional review committee,
the Government, in effect, exerts a new measure of influence that might well
play an important part in committee decision-making. Greater care in
obtaining informed consent will be of primary concern for all institutional
review committees. Aside from this difference, however, the essential
elements of the two policies remain quite similar. The PHS policy was
clearly the model for the new HEW policy, which will affect a wide range
of social research. The understanding of how the PHS policy evolved and
the values underlying it is, therefore, an important element in evaluating
the broader set of guidelines.
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